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Abstract: 
 
According to Ronald Dworkin, majoritarian democracies like the Nordic ones are founded upon the 
notion that  parliamentary majorities are elevated above the other branches of government and that 
such majorities should not be subject to judicial review. The emergence of a powerful supranational 
judicial body at the EU level which, on a regular basis, sets aside national law and sovereign 
prerogatives, therefore shakes the very foundation on which majoritarian democracies rests. This 
article shows how conceptions of democracy in the Nordics can explain the critical Nordic attitude 
towards the legitimacy of the European Court of Justice and of European law more generally. Using 
Denmark as a case, I show that national courts in a majoritarian democracy only reluctantly 
cooperate with supranational judicial bodies by referring very few cases. I argue that Nordic courts 
forward few cases to the European court of justice both because they have little experience with 
judicial review at the national level but also – and more importantly – due to a widespread hostility 
towards (supranational) judicial review in general. 
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Who is afraid of European Constitutionalism?
1
 
 
The Nordic distress with judicial review and constitutional democracy 
 
 
By Dr. Prof. Marlene Wind, University of Copenhagen
2
 
 
 
 
Is judicial review in accordance with our democratic sensibilities or should parliaments be 
unconstrained in the sense of not having to subject themselves to review be courts? Should the 
parliaments be trusted to protect fundamental rights – as some theorists3 (and certainly politicians) 
claim – or do we need independent courts for that?  
In the Nordic countries
4
 the question of judicial review has been the subject of public contestation 
in recent years
5
. That the role and legitimacy of courts and judicial bodies have been increasingly 
debated may be a result of the fact that courts and constitutionalism sticks its nose out almost 
everywhere these days and because judicial power seems to continue to grow globally as well as 
nationally
6
. Not only has the European Court of Justice cemented its powers as the EU has enlarged 
and EU legislation become more fuzzy – sworn by compromises. Also the European Court of 
Human Rights and other international dispute settlement bodies have become increasingly 
powerful
7
.  
Perhaps as a respond to this empirical trend towards judicialization, judicial review has become 
increasingly debated and challenged within academia, that is, theoretically.  The political 
philosopher Richard Bellamy has thus recently referred to the judicial review-instrument as 
‘tyranny of the minority’. He dedicated an entire volume to a full-fleshed attack on judicial review 
                                                 
1
 Forthcoming in Claudio Franzius/Franz C. Mayer/Jürgen Neyer (eds.); Modelle des Parlamentarismus im 21. 
Jahrhundert. Neue Ordnungen von Recht und Politik; Recht und Politik in der Europäschen Union Band 4,  
Baden-Baden: Nomos 2015. 
2
 Marlene Wind Professor of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. She is also Professor at iCourts Centre 
of excellence at the Faculty of Law at the University of Copenhagen. She moreover holds at Professorship (Professor II) 
in Public Law at the University of Oslo where she is project-coordinator at the Pluricourts project. I would like to thank 
my research assistant Kristoffer Krohn Schaldemose for valuable comments to this article. All remaining flaws are of 
course my responsibility.  
3
 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its critics, New haven: Yale University Press, (1989), pp. 154-159. 
4
 Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Finland. 
5
 A.Følledes & M. Wind (2009), Nordic Reluctance Towards Judicial Review under Siege, Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights, , vol. 27, no.2: 131-141. 
6
 R. Hirschl, (2006), Towards Juristocracy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
7
 K. Alter, (2014), The New Terrain of International Law, Princeton University Press. See also the iCourts project at the 
University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law where all international courts are mapped see www.icourts.jur.ku.dk 
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by courts and what he terms ‘legal’ as opposed to what he sees as a much more democratic 
‘political’ constitutionalism where all powers are left to a more or less unconstraint majority8 . As 
this brief article will show, Professor Bellamy has certainly not been talking to deaf ears in the 
Nordics. The fact that (international) courts and judicial review has become more and more prolific 
has generated a wide debate not only among specialists but equally among the  public in the Nordic 
countries. A few examples from the Nordics illustrate the growing scepticism: 
Danes have become increasingly worried that the European Court of Justice’s ever expanding rights 
interpretations will challenge their strict immigration policy. In a few recent judgements the Court 
of Justice has thus interpreted the EU’s residence directive9 and the European freedom of 
movement in a way which has forced Denmark to grant residence to non-approved asylum seekers 
married to EU citizens. The ECJ also recently argued that it was discriminatory if EU citizens 
working for a brief period in Denmark could not get access to generous university scholarships
10
.  
Both cases (and many others) caused so much stir that prominent politicians and even ministers 
wrote up-ed’s in leading newspapers shaming the European Court of Justice, arguing that judges are 
‘only’ civil servants who should not stick their nose into political matters11.  
Swedes have equally challenged the European Court. In particular the Court’s efforts to put limits 
on Swedish trade unions’ attempts to force foreign companies to sign collective agreements when 
operating in Sweden
12
.  Moreover, proposed changes by an expert group for Constitutional 
Reform
13
 to introduce some form of limited judicial review into the Swedish constitution led to a 
more than just vivid debate in Sweden among experts as well as lay people.  
In Norway, an influencial ‘Power and Democracy Study’ from 2007 concluded that there were good 
reasons to worry about international conventions and courts serving to undermine and emasculate 
popular rule
14
.  
The intriguing question is, of course, why the Nordics express such deep scepticism towards 
judicial review in stark contrast to most other European countries? 
                                                 
8
 R. Bellamy, (2007), Political Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press, see page 26. Bellamy’s distinction 
between political and legal constitutionalism corresponds roughly to the parallel distinction utilized by Dworkin 
between majoritarian and constitutional democracy. 
9
 Metock and others case 127/08. 
10
 L.N. Case 46/12. 
11
 Birthe Rønn Hornbek Berlingske Tidene August 3rd 2008. Berlingske Tidende 3. august 2008: ”Kronik: 
Udlændingeregler: EF-Domstolen skal ikke undergrave dansk lov”. [The European Court of Justice should not 
undermine Danish law]. 
12
 See the Laval case: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2008/01/articles/eu0801019i.htm 
13
 Grundlagsutredningen, SOU 2007:85, Olika former av normkontroll. 
14
 NOU (2003) NOU 2003:19 Makt- og demokratiutredningen. 
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In this article, I propose an explanation that focuses on national democratic culture. In order to 
conceptualize “democratic culture”, I draw on legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin’s distinction 
between constitutional and majoritarian democracies
15
. Whereas constitutional democracies (e.g. 
Germany) generally embrace judicial review and view it as a constitutive part of being a “true” 
democracy, majoritarian democracies (e.g. the Nordics and to some extent the UK), perceive 
parliamentary majorities as elevated above the other branches of government. And these majorities 
should not  be constraint or subject to review by courts. As this article will demonstrate, the 
democratic culture of the Nordics – which with minor variations - are all majoritarian democracies16  
– is indeed a possible explanation to the disquiet with judicial review by courts – including 
European judicial review.  
 
Due to lack of space I will exclusively focus on the Danish case in this article however, more 
specifically on the Danish courts’ relationship with the European Court of Justice. I argue that the 
Danish judges’ reluctance to forward cases (preliminary questions) to the European Court of Justice 
mirrors an ordinary hesitance and disquiet about judicial review by Danish courts when it comes 
also to national legislation
17
. It is simply not part of Danish legal and political culture. Forwarding a 
preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice by a Danish court – lower or higher – would 
thus de facto constitute an introduction of judicial review in Denmark just under much ‘worse’ 
conditions as it would be a foreign (European) court doing the job rather than the Danish Supreme 
Court. The empirical data and analysis put forward below draws on my earlier extensive work on 
this topic which has been published in a number of international journals (Wind et al., 2009; Wind, 
2009; Wind 2010; Rytter & Wind 2011)
18
. 
 
The Danish constitutional struggles 
                                                 
15
 R. Dworkin (1996), Freedoms Law, Harvard University Press. 
16
 Norway is different as judicial review is in fact allowed and practiced  to some degree in Norway. Recent research 
shows that this difference among the Nordics is also reflected in the supreme courts citation of international law. Here 
Norwegian Supreme courts cite international law and courts significantly more than Swedish and Danish. See M. Wind 
2015 forthcoming. 
17
 See Press release dated 19 February 1999 with Judgment passed on the same day by the Supreme Court; made 
public at http://www.thybo.dk/tvind.htm 
18
 This section in part draws on my article: ”When Parliament comes first: The Danish Concept of Democracy Meets 
the European Union”,  Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 2009, Vol. 27: 272-289. M. Wind et al, (2009), The Uneven 
Legal Push for Europe:  Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe, European Union Politics, 10:1: 63-
88; M.Wind (2010), The Nordic, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial Review, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 48:3: 1039-1063; J.E. Rytter & M. Wind, (2011), In Need of Juristocracy? The Silence of Denmark 
in the Development of European Legal Norms, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 9:2, 470-502.  
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Where does the Danish reluctance towards judicial review by courts come from, e.g. why did 
Denmark become a majoritarian democracy – and stayed so - as opposed to most other European 
countries after the Second World War?
19
 In fact this has never been studied and only rarely 
reflected on previously in the legal or political science scholarly literature
20
. The scepticism is not 
simply due to the fact that Denmark is a small  state with a dualist legal system. Many other 
European countries with dualist legal structures have embraced constitutionalism and the European 
legal order in full. It is more convinsing, I argue, to try to understand the Danish legal and 
democratic systems by binding together the past with the present, that is, examine how Denmark 
transformed from absolutism to a full-fledged democracy and in this process developed into a 
majoritarian system.  
  
Counter to the narrative still often heard in schools, universities and the public debate that Denmark 
always has been a decentralized state and later a very transparent democracy,
21
 the Danish historian, 
professor Gunner Lind, has characterized Denmark as one of the most centralized states in Europe 
where democracy as a division of powers never fully took root.
22
 He explains this by the strong role 
of absolutism and Danish monarchical rule, which in itself was extremely centralized:  “There were 
more pluralism and separation of power in ‘the France of the Sun King’ than under Danish 
absolutist rule.”23 As Lind argues, because Denmark had a non-violent transition from absolutism to 
democracy, the idea of one body as the ultimate authority and symbol of power in society was never 
really challenged. So when Denmark introduced democracy and ‘rule by the people’, it simply 
replaced the elevated role and status of the king with the parliament (Rigsdag). There was no 
mention of judicial review in the Danish constitution and as law professor Henning Koch has 
pointed out, the Danish Supreme Court curiously emphasized its own full support for the supremacy 
of the parliament in the same ruling where it - for the first time (in 1921) - formally stated its 
competence to try the constitutionality of legislative acts. As Koch noted:  “The Supreme Court 
                                                 
19
 See A.Stone Sweet 2004 for the argument that most European states became constitutional democracies with 
extensive judicial review mechanisms after the Second World War. See A. Stone Sweet (2004), The Judicial 
Construction of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
20
 But see Palmer Olsen, (2005), Magtfordeling, Copenhagen: Djøf. 
21
 See Hal Koch 1945 and the Danish ‘Magtudredning’ 2003 as examples. H. Koch (1945),  Hvad er Demokrati, 
Gyldendal; L.Togeby et al (2003), Magtudredningen, Gyldendal. 
22
 See also Knudsen (2001), Da Demokrati blev til Folkestyre, Akademisk Forlag, page 181; T. Knudsen (2012 4th ed.), 
Fra Enevælde til Folkestyre, Akademisk forlag, pages 122ff. 
23
 Lind cited in Knudsen 2001: 181. 
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equally resolved that in principle there were: no one over or next to the Rigsdag.”24 When the 
Rigsdag (upper chamber) was demolished in 1953, the Folketing (lower chamber) was immediately 
regarded as the most authentic representative of the ‘the people’.  
 
The negotiators of the Danish constitution of 1849 generally spend very little time on the separation 
of powers and none at all on judicial review.
25
 However, § 2 of the constitution –which is still 
active today - reads in the following way: “The legislative power rests with the King and the 
Rigsdag in unison. The executive Power rests with the King. The judicial power rests with the 
courts.”26 The Danish constitution is in other words silent on the courts’ power to exercise judicial 
review of legislation.
27
 As Jens Peter Christensen – a former law Professor – now judge in the 
Danish Supreme Court -  has pointed out, the courts were intended to be nothing but ‘les bouches de 
la loi’, and thus  not meant to play a truly independent role in the law interpretation.28 The 
politicians agreed to this subtle  role of the courts probably because judges – among the social 
democrats at least – were considered a very conservative and elitist power in society. When the first 
Danish constitution was negotiated a majority in the Danish parliament thus explicitly warned 
against any kind of judicial review by courts, and several prominent lawyers as well as politicians 
emphasized that since the judges were appointed by the king and the government they clearly could 
not be either above these instances nor on an equal footing (and thereby in a capacity to exercise 
judicial review)
29
. Interestingly, this argument resembles that of Alf Ross – the internationally most 
reckoned Danish law professor – who from a more philosophical angle argued that the courts 
logically had to be considered subordinate [underlagt]
30
 to the parliament because the parliament 
would be able to overrule any court case any time by legislating against it ex post.
31
 This clearly 
differs from the conclusion drawn by US justice Marshall in his famous ruling in 1803 in the 
                                                 
24
 H. Koch (1999), Dansk Forfatningsret i Transnational belysning, Juristen, vol. 81: 213-227, see page. 216. My 
translation from the Danish, which reads in its full text: “Thi med UFR 1921. 644 H fastlog den danske Højesteret ikke 
alene domstolenes prøvelsesret, som det normalt påpeges, men anerkendte også parlamentets overhøjhed, idet 
Højesteret brugte vendingen: ‘…den Sikkerhed, som maatte kræves … for at tilsidesætte en lov som grundlovsstridig’. 
Højesteret resolverede i samme åndedrag, at som udgangspunkt var der: Ingen over eller ved siden af  Rigsdagen” 
(Koch 1999: 126). 
25
 Knudsen 2001: 122. 
26
 In the 1953 Constitution § 2 became §3 but there were no changes in wording except Folketing replacing Rigsdag. 
27
J.P. Christensen (2003), Domstolene – den trejde statsmagt, Gyldendal, page. 11-13. 
28
 Christensen 2003: 11-13. In § 64 of the Danish Constitution it reads that “The Judges are only to obey the law” (my 
translation). In Danish: “Dommerne har I deres kald alene at rette sig efter loven”. 
29
 Christensen 2003: 12-13; see also Schaumburg-Müller (2009), Parliamentary Precedence in Denmark- a 
Jurisprudential Assessment, Nordic Journal of Human Rights, vol. 27, no.2: 170-185.  
30
 See Palmer Olsen’s discussion of Ross 2005: 296ff. 
31
 Palmer Olsen 2005: 296. 
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Marbury v. Madison case. This case not only established judicial review of courts in the United 
States but is also again and again referred to by constitutional theorists saying that: “If then the 
courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to an ordinary act of the 
legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both 
apply”32. 
 
All this is not meant to imply that judicial review by courts is directly illegal in the Danish 
constitution from 1849 as it was until very recently in both the Finnish and the Swedish 
constitution.
33
 Most constitutional lawyers in Denmark would probably argue that judicial review is 
a theoretical possibility but a possibility that should be avoided by all means. The judges should 
thus exhibit ‘self-restraint’ and leave it to the politicians and the majority in parliament – not only to 
rule but also to protect basic rights (Rytter 2001; Rytter & Wind 2011). Danish courts have no 
doubt conducted self-restraint over the years and continue to do so. As Rytter and Wind writes:  
 
“ Generally speaking, it [self-restraint] means that whenever judicial review is undertaken on the 
basis of broad and imprecise constitutional provisions like for instance human rights, which often 
have this character of being broad legal principles, the courts should give significant leeway or 
margin to the assessment of the legislator, recognising the direct democratic mandate of the latter. 
More precisely, judicial self-restraint means that, vis-à-vis the legislator, a court should not insist in 
every detail on its own final say as to the specific contents of broad constitutional norms.”34 
So even though the theoretical possibility of judicial review was established in case law back in 
1921, it never entered into the most recent constitutional amendment in 1953 and has only led to 
‘judicial overturning’35 of a legislative act once in the past 165 years in the Tvind case from 199836 . 
Being formally elected by the people  as only parliaments are has thus always been considered the 
ultimate symbol of democratic legitimacy in Denmark – also in the academic literature on 
democracy. The Danish constitutional lawyer Jens Elo Rytter implicitly says exactly this when he in 
                                                 
32
 Here cited from Eivind Smith (1993), Høyesterett og Folketyret, Universitetsforlaget i Oslo, page. 306. 
33
 See M. Schenin (2001), The Welfare State and Constitutionalism in the Nordic Countries, Copenhagen: Nordisk Råd.  
34
 N. 7 J. E. Rytter & M. Wind supra 6, p. 5. 
35
 There is a great difference between officially endorsing the institution of judicial review and implicitly accepting the 
institution in principle. It is also useful to distinguish the right of judicial review with actual judicial setting aside of 
national legislation. 
36
 Christensen 2005; Palmer Olsen 2005; Knudsen 2006. This does not mean, however, that the ordinary courts 
(Denmark has no administrative courts) do not review administrative acts. They do. However, setting aside legislation 
from is an entirely different matter. 
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the quote below refers to ‘election’ as being the ultimate definition of democratic legitimacy in the 
Nordic countries:  
 
 
“Common to the constitutional tradition of the Nordic countries […] there is an emphasis on the 
preferred position of Parliament in the constitutional power structure based on its democratic mandate 
though elections. The courts have no similar democratic mandate and, therefore, the judicial review of 
legislation is either problematic in principle or should at least be kept within rather narrow limits.”37 
 
The logic here is however puzzling from a constitutional point of view. Was the shielding of judges 
from popular ballots not precisely what was desired when Montesquieu launched the principle of 
the separation of powers? Being protected from elections and other popularity contests was exactly 
what gave courts and judges their role as indispensable components in the protection of basic rights, 
one could argue. This is however not how many Danish law professors and politicians have 
perceived it.  The rather sceptical approach to rights protection by supranational judicial bodies is 
well illustrated by a Danish law professor who for years questioned Denmarks joining the European 
Convention of Human Rights.  It was signed by Denmark in 1953, but not given legal effect 
(incorporated) in Danish law until 1992. Professor Gorm Toftegaard Nielsen thus argues that 
Denmark never needed this Convention. Denmark does not – as he sees it – have any problems with 
human rights (unlike other European countries),
38
 but simply joined because: “[w]e would like to 
help other countries who had problems with their human rights protection”.39 The fact that he and 
many others in Danish society saw Denmark as elevated above human rights conflicts combined 
with a sceptical view on judges (as opposed to politicians) as the best human rights guradians, may 
explain why it took 40 years before the convention was incorporated into Danish law and applied 
by the Danish courts.
40
 
 
It now seems more understandable why the Danish political and legal establishment and the general 
public have expressed such scepticism towards the Danish engagement in not just the ECJ but also 
in ECtHR: By joining these European legal mechanisms, we have de facto subjected ourselves to 
judicial review by two strong international courts, which stand in stark contrast to the majoritarian 
tradition outlined above. If there is no tradition for judicial review at home, how can we then accept 
                                                 
37
 J. E. Rytter Grundrettigheder. Domstolenes fortolkning og kontrol med lovgivningsmagten (2000), page 138. 
38
 G. T. Nielsen (2001), Parlamentarismen – hvem tog magten?, Århus Universitets Forlag, page 170. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Togeby et al 2003: 119; see also Koch, Røberg, Schaumburg-Müller & Vedsted-Hansen 2004. 
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almost daily judicial review and scrutiny of national legislation by international judicial bodies? In 
practice, it seems that Denmark constantly tries  to keep the judicial review of the European Courts 
at bay and thus at an absolute minimum level. Below I will sketch how this can be illustrated by 
looking at the rather low level of preliminary references submitted by Danish courts to the 
European Court of Justice.    
 
Denmark and European Judicial review
41
 
The still unsettled issue of a judicial dialogue between the courts of the member states and the 
European Court of Justice thus illustrates and underscores the continuing relevance of the more 
philosophical discussion between constitutional and majoritarian democracies. Due to the full 
fledged Danish adoption of the Dworkinian majoritarian democracy-conception with the lawmaker 
at the centre, Danish courts – and indeed the public administration managing the day to day 
business with the EU – have not been too eager to send cases to the ECJ for interpretation. The 
preliminary ruling system, which was introduced into the Union with the treaty of Rome in 1957 
(then art. 177) and which requires all courts and tribunals to refer cases to the ECJ if in doubt about 
the interpretation of EU law, thus introduces a judicial review mechanism fundamentally foreign to 
Danish legal and political tradition.
42
 A political and legal culture with no tradition of judicial 
review, clearly must regard it as counter-intuitive to ask a supranational court to evaluate and judge 
on what a Danish lawmaker (and administration) has been deciding when implementing EU law. 
What makes it even ‘worse’ is of course that we in addition are dealing with a supranational court, 
which do not reveal dissenting votes and which employs a dynamic style of legal interpretation.
43
 
The political control with the courts, which is – I will argue - implicit and very rarely discussed in a 
Nordic context, is thus non-existent in the European system. The EU’s preliminary ruling 
mechanism in this manner not only introduces judicial review into a Danish legal and political 
system which has explicitly and consistently rejected it, but it also introduces collaboration with a 
constitutional judicial system that even celebrates legal activism (e.g. a dynamic style of 
interpretation), and which confronts the Danish ”self-restraint philosophy” head on. 
                                                 
41
 The section above draws on my previous work and a piece written together with Dorte Martinsen in a Festschrift for 
Hjalte Rasmussen from 2010. D.S Martinsen & M. Wind (2010),  When national courts go to Europe. Reluctant or 
active players in the integration process? In H. Koch, K. Hagel-Sørensen, U. Haltern & J.Weiler (eds.), Europe: The New 
Legal Realism, Djøf Publishing, Copenhagen.  
42
 Wind, Martinsen & Rotger (2009); and Rytter & Wind (2011) 
43
 H. Rasmussen (1986), On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice, Martinus Nijhoff. 
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Referring cases to the ECJ when in doubt of the interpretation of EU law is nevertheless the 
cornerstone in the EU constitutional order and something that all Nordic countries have had to learn 
to live with – even Iceland and Norway, which are part of the European Economic Area (EEA).44 In 
order to make sure that the EU’s legal system develops in a harmonious and uncontradictory 
manner and to secure that citizens and enterprises are equally protected in all of Europe, it is (and 
always has been) essential that national courts engage in an open and deliberate dialogue with the 
European Court of Justice.  
In a long-term perspective, national courts – in the EU as a whole – have indeed accepted and taken 
up that role.
45
 The statistics presented below however also reveals great differences between the 
European countries.  
 
Overall, Article 267 (previously art. 234 and art. 177) references continued to increase significantly 
between 1961, when the first preliminary reference was forwarded to the Court, and 2013. Figure 1 
illustrates this trend. 
 
Figure 1
46
  
                                                 
44
 J. H. H Weiler, ’The Transformation of Europe’, (1991), The Yale Law Journal 100: 2403-2483. 
45
 K. J. Alter, ‘The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?’, (2000) 
International Organizations 54(3): 489–518; see also K. J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The 
Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe. (2001) Oxford University Press. 
46
 Own data elaborated on the basis of: The Annual Report 2013, The Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(2013). 
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By the end of 2008, 6317 preliminary references had been made to the European Court. From 1993 
onwards, more than 200 references were made annually, with a maximum of  288 references in 
2008 and 450 in 2013. The interplay between national courts and the European Court is thus a 
growth factor on its own in the European integration process and in many ways a huge success. 
However, as indicated above, my data also confirms that national courts are not equally eager to 
participate in this general trend. Figure 2 present the number of references from the different EU 
member states.  
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Figure 2
47
 
 
 
 
It is clear, however, that the differences in the total number of references per member state may be 
explained by various factors. The length of membership seems to play a role, as Belgium, Germany, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands have had the highest number of references, whereas the later 
arriving EU-12 member states for the most part have made much fewer. If we take year of 
membership into account, heterogeneity is however still significant, as Figure 3 demonstrates.  
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Figure 3
48
 
 
 
It has been argued that “population size” may in part explain the heterogeneity across member 
states’ reference practice, i.e. that the larger states will refer more often than smaller states.49 
However, when controlling for this factor, the variance across member states is still remarkable. In 
my previous work, I have demonstrated that there is no significant causality between population 
size and preliminary reference practice.
50
 In political science terminology, this means that 
population size cannot explain the different number of preliminary references that come from any 
individual country. A very good example of this is apparent when we compare Austria and Sweden. 
They entered the EU the same year – in 1995 – and have on average the same population size, 
however, when looking at the figures, it is clear that Austria – a constitutional democracy with a 
                                                 
48
 Ibid. Years of membership is calculated between 1958 and 2013.   
49
 N. Fenger ’Om danske domstoles relative tilbøjelighed til at forelægge præjudicielle spørgsmål for EU-domstolen’, 
(2009) Juristen, vol 91, no. 10, pages 269-279. See also M.Broberg & N. Fenger (2014 2nd.ed), Preliminary references to 
the European Court of Justice, Oxford University Press. 
50
 Wind, Martinsen & Rotger (2009), page 79.   
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very strong judicial review tradition - has referred more than four times the number of cases than 
the Swedish majoritarian democracy (Wind 2010)
51
.  
To put it differently, differences in population sizes do not explain why some member states refer 
more cases than others. After all, individuals trying to make their case before the European Court 
have a long, tiring and troubled way to go before reaching the European Court. In sum, the absence 
of causality between population size and preliminary references substantiates the plausibility  that 
my proposed explanation, ‘type of democracy’ and tradition of judicial review, serves to increase 
our understanding of the differences and similarities in the interplay between the EU and national 
courts.  
 
Denmark as the not so dutiful pupil in the class 
As a European Community member since 1973, Denmark has had considerable time to accustom 
itself to the European legal system. Moreover, Denmark is often referred to as “the dutiful pupil in 
the class” when it comes to formal implementation of EU legislation. This is no doubt a correct 
description if we are merely interested in formal and not practical implementation
52
.  Moreover, as 
Hagel Sørensen (a long time legal advisor to the Danish government) has pointed out – the reason 
for Denmark’s high and fast implementation frequency concerning EU legislative acts can be 
explained by the fact that these are executed administratively. In other EU member states, Italy for 
instance, the delegation from the legislative to the administrative branch is subject to much stricter 
constitutional procedures, which clearly influences how fast and vivid the implementation of EU 
law can be processed.
53
 Regarding sufficient implementation in practice, Denmark does, however, 
not always live up to its reputation as one of the most obedient compliers.
54
    
                                                 
51
 M. Wind, ’The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial Review’, (2010), Journal of 
Common Market Studies 48(4) pages 1041-1065; see also Rytter & Wind (2011). 
52
 The difference between formal and practical is important. Formal implementation simply deals with objective time 
deadlines i.e. whether a certain directive is transposed into national law by a certain pre-specified time limit. It is 
Ministries themselves who rapport to the Commission whether this deadline has been met or not. Practical 
implementation on the other hand deals with the actual and practical transformation of a EU legislative act on the 
ground. I.e. in the local administration, vis-a-vis citizens and firms and on the home pages communicating about EU 
rights and obligations to the broader public.  
53
 K. Hagel-Sørensen ’Fællesskabsretten som en del af dansk ret’, (1994) Festskrift til Ole Due, Copenhagen: G.E.C. 
GadsForlag: 115. 
54
 D. S. Martinsen ‘The Europeanisation of Welfare – The Domestic Impact of Intra-European Social Security’, (2005) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 43(5): 1003–30; D. S. Martinsen’The Europeanisation of gender equality : who 
controls the scope of non-discrimination?’, (2007), Journal of European Public Policy 14(4): 544-562; D. S. Martinsen, & 
K. Vrangbæk ‘The Europeanization of Health Care Governance: Implementing the Market Imperatives of Europe’, 
(2008), Public Administration 86(1): 169–85. 
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Returning to the role and impact of the Danish courts, the findings presented in figures 2 and 3 
above indicate that Denmark is one of the member states that has made fewest preliminary 
references to the ECJ; a total of 122 between 1973 and 2008 or an average of 3.39 cases per year of 
membership.  
Earlier studies have demonstrated that the preliminary reference procedure in Denmark is in part 
conditioned by an extraordinarily close relationship with the executive branch (the Ministry of 
Justice and Foreign Affairs) and the Danish courts.
55
 Historically, there has always been a close 
relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the national courts. Until 1999, Danish judges were 
exclusively recruited from the Ministry of Justice, and the loyalty to this executive body remains 
almost unchallenged (Interviews, Danish judges and civil servants, March 2006).
56
 This in part 
explains why the so-called Judicial Committee plays an influential role when it comes to 
preliminary references. In one study, Law professor Peter Pagh demonstrated how the Judicial 
Committee not only advises the Danish courts through the attorney of the Danish state by 
participating in both the selection and drafting of art. 267-questions which goes to the ECJ, but also 
at the same time advice the government in the implementation of EU law.
57
  
 
As there is also no tradition for exercising the judicial review of legislation in Denmark, the 
preliminary reference procedure has by some been been regarded as an unnecessary foreign element 
interfering in matters which should be dealt with by the national courts themselves 
58
. Danish courts 
have thus repeatedly invoked the acte claire doctrine, and thereby avoided asking the ECJ to clarify 
whether national law was in breach with EU law.  
Moreover, as demonstrated by Pagh, from 1986 to 2003, the Judicial Committee recommended to 
the national courts not to refer a case to the ECJ in 20 out of 26 cases, even though all 26 cases dealt 
with the interpretation of EU law and at least one of the parties had explicitly requested an 
interpretation by the Court of Justice.
59
 Generally speaking, the Judicial Committee has only 
recommended Danish courts to make preliminary references in those cases where there is already 
                                                 
55
 P. Pagh ‘Præjudicielle forelæggelser og Juridisk Specialudvalg’, (2004) Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 41: 305–13.;  
P. Pagh ‘Bopælspligt, menneskerettigheder og EU-ret: en kommentar til U 2007.99 H I lyset af nye EF-domme.’ (2007) 
Ugeskrift for retsvæsen: 126-132. See also Wind 2010 (JCMS article). 
56
 J. P. Christensen Domstolene – den tredje statsmagt. (2003) Aarhus: Magtudredningen, 75-90;  
57
 P. Pagh (2008), Juridisk Specialudvalg og præjudicielle forelæggelser for EF-domstolen, in  B. E. Olsen & K.Engsig 
Sørensen (red.), Europæiseringen af Dansk Ret, Copenhagen: Djøf. 
58
 Own research; see also, Pagh (2004), page 63. 
59
 Pagh (2008) page 307. 
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direct action being taken against Denmark by the Commission.
60
 Whereas the Judicial Committee 
may “just be doing its job” - that is advising the one party in a case - the Danish government-  it is 
perhaps more puzzling that the Danish courts and judges treat this advice as “the highest legal 
expertise” – as one of the judges interviewed put it (Wind 2010)61. However, being brought up in 
the Ministry of Justice themselves (which is still common), most judges may fell inclined to take 
advice from this source very seriously.  
There is in other words an enormous unease and unfamiliarity with the European legal system 
which is further emphasised by the dominance of Scandinavian legal realism and its “anti-rights” 
tradition in the Nordic countries (Nergelius 2001).
62
 In Denmark and the other Nordic countries, 
there is a firm conviction that rights should be decided by the politicians – not the courts. The 
problem is, however, that the international legal development – not only in the EU but also in the 
European Court of Human rights – pushes in the opposite direction. The losers if and when national 
courts refuse (deliberately or by other means) to protect fundamental rights – of any kind – will 
obviously be the citizens. Many things suggest in other words that in countries with majoritarian 
democracy, with little or no tradition of judicial review and active human rights protection by 
national courts, the impact of European rights may be felt less strongly. The result may ultimately 
be an uneven rights protection in Europe and a less deep felt one in the Nordics. This despite the 
fact that we like to look at ourselves as ‘moral superpowers’ vis-à-vis the rest of the world63. 
 
Conclusion 
In Denmark and the rest of the Nordic part of Europe, there is a broad but unspoken  consensus that 
democracy equals the will of the majority in parliament and that this majority should be more or 
less unconstraint by other powers. Close links between the courts, the legislature and the executive 
                                                 
60
 In particular, the infamous ‘can-case’, case c-246/99, in which Denmark was charged by the Commission for 
hindering the implementation of directive 94/62 dealing with the marketing of cans instead of ordinary bottles on the 
Danish market. 
61
 In 2006 I did a comprehensive survey of 388 Danish judges and their practice with the preliminary ruling procedure. 
Several of these judges were later interviewed in depth. Civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Law Office and 
the Ministry of Justice were also interviewed. 
62
 See J. Negelius (2001), North and South: Can the Nordic States and the European Continent Find each other in the 
Constitutional Area – or are they too different?, in M. Scheinin, The Welfare State and Constitutionalism in the Nordic 
Countries. See also J. E. Rytter Grundrettigheder. Domstolenes fortolkning og kontrol med lovgivningsmagten (2000); 
see also Rytter & Wind (2011). 
63
 The term ’moral superpowers’ has been used by sevral in the international relations literature.See generally L. Elliot 
& G. Cheeseman (eds), (2004) Forces for Good, Manchester University Press; see also Wind 2015 forthcoming.  
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branches of government are moreover regarded as a pragmatic and efficient way of managing 
politics and day to day business. Indeed, the successful Nordic welfare states see their corporatist 
structure, homogenous culture and more or less unconstrained parliaments as role models for other 
democracies and as eminent examples of good democratic principles, where ”the will of the people” 
is reflected in political majoritarian decisions. This consensus approach to law and politics may 
work smoothly in homogenous societies with few violent conflicts and little ethnic diversity. 
However, as both the EU and the juridicalization of politics becomes more and more prevalent, we 
may face severe challenges. Moreover, not everyone believes that the Nordic reticence is 
sustainable in a globalizing world. One of the rather few critical voices in the Danish judiciary on 
this point is the former Danish President of the Supreme Court Niels Pontoppidan who some years 
back warned against the ‘Parliament comes first’ rhetoric in the 21 century: 
“The development since the Second World War has strongly reduced the importance of the lawmaker 
as the most important source of law and legitimation. It simply no longer covers legal realities 
sufficiently”64  
Only time will tell whether Pontoppidans analysis will spark any changes to the current state of 
affairs in the Danish constitutional debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Niels Pontoppidan - then President of the Supreme Court - in an interview in the Danish journal Weekendavisen 28 
June 1996, p. 11. 
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